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SUPERVISORY SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND EMPLOYER LIABILITY:
THE THIRD CIRCUIT SHEDS LIGHT ON VICARIOUS LIABILITY
AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
I. INTRODUCTION
In today's environment, few employers, even those as noteworthy as
the President of the United States, can afford to turn a blind eye towards
the issue of sexual harassment.1 The number of claims of sexual harass-
ment by employees is rapidly increasing.2 A significant number of those
complaints have been filed against the employee's supervisor, as opposed
to his or her co-workers. 3 Furthermore, the stakes are increasing as evi-
denced by a recent $8.3 million award to a television anchorwoman whose
suit against her employer included charges of sexual harassment.
4
Sexual harassment has been the subject of extensive litigation since
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645 (Title VII) strictly forbade dis-
crimination in the workplace on the basis of sex. 6 Through this litigation,
the judiciary has attempted to resolve many of the questions left open by
1. See Margaret Carlson, Sexual Harassment Chapter 999: This Time the Accused is
Max .Baucus. Do We Know Wen to Care Anymore , TIME , Sept. 20, 1999, at 45 (re-
hashing effects of Paula Jones sexual harassment suit against President Clinton).
2. See Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 1998) (not-
ing complaints filed with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and state
agencies have more than doubled from 6,833 in 1991 to 15,880 in 1997 (citing
<http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html>)); Brian S. Kruse, Note, Strike One-
You're Out! Cautious Employers Lose Under New Sexual Harassment Law: Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998), 78 NEB. L. REv. 444, 444 (1999) (noting
that of 266 organizations surveyed, average number of sexual harassment com-
plaints increased by .78 between 1995 and 1997 (citing Stacy VanDerWall, Sexual
Harassment Complaints Rising, SHRM Survey Finds, SHRM/HR NEws Online (Mar.
15, 1999) <http:www.shrm.org/hmews/articles/031599a.html>)).
3. See Kruse, supra note 2, at 444-45 (calculating that 24% of complaints dis-
cussed in cited surveyed were brought against supervisor).
4. See Alain L. Sanders, Television: The Dangers of Dropping Anchor, TIME DAILY
(Jan. 29, 1999), available at http://www.time.com/time/daily/0,2960,19111,00.
html (recounting story of television network forced to pay $8.3 million to televi-
sion anchor whose charges included sexual harassment); see also Jordan Lite, Ex-
UPS Manager Awarded $80M, Assoc. PREsS, Feb. 12, 1998, available in Westlaw, AS-
SOCPR Database (revealing that Ex-UPS manager received $80.7 million from
United Parcel Service after claiming that company created sexually hostile work
environment and retaliated against her after she formally complained that driver
poked her in breast).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2) (a) (1) (1998).
6. See id. (stating that it is "unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin") (emphasis added).
(767)
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the statute's sweeping language and its sparse legislative history.7 For
years, the United States Supreme Court appeared reluctant to address sex-
ual harassment, not issuing its first opinion on the subject until 1986, and
then only once more in 1993.8 The Court then released a tumult of deci-
sions regarding sexual harassment beginning in 1998, including Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth9 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,10 decided on the
same day and addressing the issue of employer liability.1 1 The decisions in
Ellerth and Faragher have significantly reshaped sexual harassment, specifi-
cally in how courts must now approach employer liability when a supervi-
sor sexually harasses an employee.' 2
This Casebrief focuses on when employers may be held liable for sex-
ually hostile environments created by their supervisors.13 Part II briefly
examines how sexual harassment has evolved through statutory and
agency law. 14 Part III discusses the Third Circuit's most recent treatment
of sexual harassment. 15 Part IV acts as a practical guide in the Third Cir-
cuit for preventing and litigating employer liability for supervisory actions
7. SeeJustin P. Smith, Note, Letting the Master Answer: Employer Liability for Sex-
ual Harassment in the Workplace After Faragher and Burlington Industries, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1786, 1789 (1999) (noting wide latitude given to judiciary due to statute's
broad language and lack of legislative history).
8. See Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (instructing
courts to look to agency law to determine employer liability). After its decision in
Menitor, the Court did not hand down another decision on sexual harassment until
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), which approved of Meritors ap-
proach to an employer's liability.
9. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
10. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
11. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist. 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998) (find-
ing that under Title XI school district could be liable for teacher's sexual harass-
ment of student only if official with authority to take action has "actual notice" of
problem and does not act); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. 523 U.S. 75,
82 (1998) (holding that Title VII applies to same-sex sexual harassment in work-
place). The Supreme Court continued its foray into sexual harassment with two
additional decisions in 1999. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526,
534-35 (1999) (concluding that employer's conduct does not have to be egregious
for plaintiff to receive punitive damages under Title VII); Davis v. Monroe County
Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (holding that under Title XI school district
may be liable for one student's sexual harassment of another student if district
"acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment").
12. See Steven D. Baderian et al., Managing Employment Risks in Light of the New
Rulings in Sexual Harassment Law, 21 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 343, 351 (1999) (noting
Supreme Court holdings will substantially change sexual harassment law in United
States).
13. For a discussion of the significance of employer liability for sexual harass-
ment in today's climate, see supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of sexual harassment in the context of Title VII and
agency law, see infra notes 18-79 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the latest two Third Circuit cases dealing with em-
ployer liability for sexual harassment, see infra notes 80-103 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 45: p. 767
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resulting in a sexually hostile environment.' 6 Finally, Part V summarizes
the position of the Third Circuit, including some questions the court may
address.1
7
II. BACKGROUND
A. Sexual Discrimination Finds Its Way into Title VII
The initial draft of Title VII did not protect individuals from sexual
discrimination.18 Rather, bill opponents added sex discrimination at the
last minute in an attempt to defeat the bill. 19 Despite this effort, the bill
successfully passed and became law.20 Although sexual discrimination was
prohibited under Title VII, the Act's sweeping language and lack of legis-
lative history, resulting from its last minute insertion on the floor of the
House of Representatives, provided courts with little guidance as to how it
should be applied.2 ' As of 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit was one of only three other circuits recognizing sexual
harassment as a Title VII violation. 22 In Tomkins v. Public Service Electric &
Gas Co., 23 the Third Circuit subjected employers to strict vicarious liability
for sexual harassment by its supervisors based on agency doctrine.
24
Agency law, however, provides several different doctrines for holding a
16. For a discussion of how to prevent and litigate employer liability for sexu-
ally hostile environments in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 104-53 and accompa-
nying text.
17. For the conclusion of this Casebrief, see infra notes 154-57 and accompa-
nying text.
18. See Baderian et al., supra note 12, at 344 (noting sexual discrimination was
not included in original version of Tite VII).
19. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting opponents
inserted sex discrimination to block passage of bill).
20. See Baderian et al., supra note 12, at 344 (recounting that bill passed de-
spite insertion of sexual discrimination provision).
21. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1789 (attributing lack of legislative history to
insertion of sexual discrimination into Title VII on floor of House of Representa-
tives); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (noting
prohibition against sexual discrimination was inserted into Title VII at last min-
ute); Baderian et al., supra note 12, at 344 (discussing lack of legislative history for
sexual discrimination).
22. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (recognizing
sexual harassment as Title VII violation); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,
568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977) (concluding that Title VII is violated when
supervisor sexually harasses subordinate); Barnes, 561 F.2d at 993 (recognizing sex-
ual harassment as Title VII violation); Garber v. Saxon Bus. Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d
1032, 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (same).
23. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
24. See id. at 1048-49 (finding that under agency doctrine, Tite VII is violated
when supervisor sexually harasses employee). A standard of strict vicarious liability
for an employer means that the employer would automatically be liable if the har-
asser has committed sexual harassment. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1791 (providing
definition of strict vicarious liability).
3
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principal liable for the acts of an agent.25 As a result, strict vicarious liabil-
ity was soon joined by negligence standards leading to a lack of uniformity
in the circuit courts.
26
B. The Rise of Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment in the Midst of
Agency Law
In order to give some direction to the lower courts, the United States
Supreme Court addressed sexual harassment for the first time in Meritor
Savings Bank, F.S.B v. inson.27 In Meritor, a female bank employee
claimed her supervisor had subjected her to various forms of sexual harass-
ment, such as inviting her to dinner and suggesting that they go to a
nearby hotel to have sexual relations. 28 Although the supervisor never
threatened the plaintiff with any adverse actions if she refused his ad-
vances, the plaintiff engaged in sexual intercourse with her supervisor,
claiming that she feared losing herjob.2 9 Over the course of her four-year
employment the plaintiff received several merit-based promotions, but was
eventually dismissed for excessive use of sick leave.30
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY DOCTRINE § 219 (1958) (defining
liability of master for acts of agents). The Restatement provides:
When Master is Liable for Torts of His Servants
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed
while acting in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the princi-
pal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was
aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relation.
Id.
26. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1788-93 (discussing alternative employer negli-
gence standards that have been employed by courts over years). Courts have alter-
natively required the employer to have constructive notice, meaning the employer
was negligent in learning about the harassment and allowing it to continue. See id.
at 1791. The Third Circuit later adopted this approach. See, e.g., Andrews v. City
of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990) (employing constructive notice
liability). Alternatively, some courts look to whether the employer had actual no-
tice of the harassment and then allowed it to continue. See Smith, supra note 7, at
1791 (discussing courts that consider whether employer. put on notice of
harassment).
27. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
28. See id. at 60. The plaintiff also alleged that her supervisor exposed himself
to her in the ladies room and fondled her in the presence of other employees. See
id.
29. See id. It was also for this reason that plaintiff claimed she did not report
her supervisors behavior to anyone at the bank and did not take advantage of
existing complaint procedures. See id. at 61.
30. See id. at 59-60.
4
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In Meritor, the Court refused to establish a clear rule concerning em-
ployer liability for sexual harassment committed by a supervisor.3 1 In-
stead, the Court determined that employer liability should be determined
by adhering to traditional agency law. 32 The Court did, however, offer the
ambiguous observation that employers should not "always automatically
[be] liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors," nor should the
"mere existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimina-
tion, coupled with [the employees'] failure to invoke that procedure" insu-
late the employer from liability.
3 3
The Meritor Court also acknowledged two categories of sexual harass-
ment, quid pro quo, which first appeared in 1981 in the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guidelines and hostile
environment.3 4 Subsequently, these categories have been developed in
the circuit courts.3 5 Quid pro quo harassment occurs when an employee
is forced to choose between giving in to sexual demands or forfeiting some
job benefit, such as a raise or promotion. 36 For example, in Robinson v.
City of Pittsburgh,3 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
31. See id. at 72 (declining "to issue a definitive rule on employer liability").
32. See id. (noting Congress' intention that courts look to agency principles
for employer liability). For an excerpt from THE RESTATEMENT. (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219 (1958), see supra note 24.
33. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
34. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1981) (establishing guidelines based on quid pro
quo sexual harassment by employer).
35. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66 (discussing quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment development in circuit courts).
36. See, e.g., Highlander v. KF.C. Nat'l Mgrnt. Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir.
1986) ("Quid pro quo sexual harassment is anchored in an employer's sexually
discriminatory behavior which compels an employee to elect between acceding to
sexual demands and forfeiting job benefits, continued employment or promotion,
or otherwise suffering tangible job detriments."); Smith, supra note 7, at 1805 (not-
ing quid pro quo occurs when job benefits such as "retention or discharge, salary
change, promotion or demotion" are conditioned on sexual favors); see also Bur-
lington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998) (defining quid pro quo
more simply as "cases based on threats which are carried out"). In Robinson v. City
of Pittsburgh the Third Circuit considered the elements of a quid pro claim for the
first time. 120 F.3d 1286, 1296 (3d Cir. 1997). In doing so, the court adopted the
elements set out in the EEOC regulations, sections 1604.11(a) (1) and (2):
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment and (2) submission to
or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for em-
ployment decisions affecting such individual.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)-(2).
There is no precise definition of quid pro quo sexual harassment, and the
general concept has been refined over the years. For a detailed discussion of how
the definition of quid pro quo harassment has evolved at the hands of the EEOC
and various federal courts, see Philip K. Lyon & Bruce H. Phillips, Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth: Sexual Harassment Under
Title VII Reaches Adolescence, 29 U. MEM. L. REv. 601, 609-617 (1999).
37. 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997).
5
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cuit found quid pro quo sexual harassment for a female police officer who
had been denied a transfer to the detective bureau because she refused
her unit commander's sexual advances. 38 In the wake of Meritor, the
Third Circuit joined the other circuits in holding that an employer is
strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment by a supervisor who had actual
or apparent authority over the employee. 39
38. See Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1298-99. In finding quid pro quo harassment,
the Third Circuit focused on events that resulted in real or tangible negative con-
sequences. See id. at 1296-97 (stating that "consequences attached to employee's
response to sexual advances must be sufficiently severe 'as to affect compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"'). For instance, the officer de-
scribed incidents where, after she rejected her supervisor, he would unjustifiably
reprimand her in public, would frequently bother her at work and call her at
home for reasons unrelated to work. See id. at 1298. The court was unwilling to
find that these incidents were sufficient to constitute quid pro quo harassment. See
id. (finding that allegations did not affect "compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges"). The court did speculate that reprimands that resulted. in a poor nota-
tion in a personnel file might be sufficient for quid pro quo harassment. See id.
(noting that formal reprimands could result in quid pro quo harassment, but
harsh words without consequences would not).
39. See id. at 1296-97 n.9 (noting that all "[c]ourts have unanimously held an
employer strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment by supervisor . . ."); see also
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752-53 (observing that after Meritor, circuit courts subjected
employers to strict vicarious liability for quid pro quo claims). As authority for the
conclusion that strict liability should attach to quid pro quo harassment, the court
cited the opinion in Meitor. See id. It is worth noting, however, that such language
never appears in the Mentior opinion, although it was implied in the Court's deci-
sion that under the EEOC an employer could be held strictly liable in such circum-
stances. See Baderian et al., supra note 12, at 347 (noting that although Meritor is
often cited as authority for strict employer liability under quid pro quo, no such
language ever appears in opinion). The Supreme Court did not hand down strict
employer liability for quid pro quo harassment; instead, various circuit courts de-
veloped it. See id. (noting federal courts of appeal consistently hold that employers
are strictly liable when plaintiffs establish quid pro quo claims).
From as early as 1994, however, the Third Circuit found support for strict
liability outside of Meritor by turning to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219(1) (1958), which, the court noted in dicta, is often used to determine liabil-
ity in quid pro quo cases. See Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106
(1994) (observing that other courts have found support for strict liability in quid
pro quo cases on basis of agency law); see also Ellerth 524 U.S. at 765 (same); Dur-
ham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 152 (1999) (same); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790-91 (1998) (noting that agency law has been inter-
preted to require strict liability for harassment committed by employers while act-
ing within scope of employment). Restatement section 219(1) holds employers
liable for any torts their employees commit while acting within the scope of their
employment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (stating em-
ployer is liable for torts of employee while acting in scope of employment). Quid
pro quo cases lend themselves to scope-of-employment liability because the super-
visor has usually used his or her authority over the employee to extract sexual
favors. See Faraghe, 524 U.S. at 803 (noting that when supervisor discriminates, he
or she draws on his or her supervisory position). The employer is responsible be-
cause without the authority bestowed on the supervisor by his or her employment,
the quid pro quo harassment would not be possible. See id. at 802 (stating courts
have noted that supervisory relationship assists harassing supervisor).
6
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Hostile environment harassment, unlike quid pro quo, only requires
that the harassing conduct create an offensive or abusive working environ-
ment and does not subject the employer to strict liability. 40 Successful
employer liability claims based on a hostile environment require courts to
consider several factors, including a respondeat superior element.41
Following the prompting of the Supreme Court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Bouton v. BMW of North America,
Inc.,4 2 found satisfaction of the respondeat superior element by following
the Restatement of Agency ("Restatement"). 43 In Bouton, a female em-
ployee alleged that her supervisor had sexually harassed her by, among
other things, rubbing up against her in sexually provocative ways.4 4 In
As one commentator has noted, however, whether a supervisor is acting within
the scope of his employment often depends on the viewpoint of the observer. See
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Em-
ployers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 66, 88
(1995) (examining viewpoints of employer, supervisor and employee). From the
employer's viewpoint, the harassment may be unrelated to the task for which the
supervisor was hired. See id. (stating employer may view behavior as outside scope
of employment or as private matter). The supervisor might also fail to conceive
that his ability to subject the employee to his harassment stems from his position.
See id. (stating that supervisor may not view harassment as privilege of position).
But from the employee's point of view, the supervisor's ability to harass
her is created precisely by the agency relationship, which affords the su-
pervisor the authority to call her into his presence, to retain her in his
presence over her objections, to use his responsibility to act as the voice
of the employer to place her in a compromising position, and to take
liberties with her personal privacy beyond the reach of a co-equal ac-
quaintance, or a stranger.
Id.
40. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-67 (establishing basis for hostile environment
harassment). In Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., the Court attempted to clarify when a
hostile environment exists. 510 U.S. 17, 20-21 (1993). The Court explained that a
reasonable person must find the conduct hostile, and that the plaintiff must also
find the conduct hostile. See id. at 21-22. (explaining that conduct must be objec-
tively and subjectively hostile); see also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d
1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d
20, 25 (1997) (same).
41. See Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing
necessary factors to make out prima facie case of hostile environment sexual har-
assment (citing Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482)); Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 447 (3d
Cir. 1994) (listing factors necessary to establish prima facie hostile environment
(citing Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482)). For a prima facie case of hostile environment
sexual harassment, the Knabe court required the plaintiff to show:
(1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of [his or
her] sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the dis-
crimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination
would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that
position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.
Knabe, 114 F.3d at 410.
42. 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994).
43. See id. at 106 (noting that Supreme Court has instructed courts to use
agency principles to decide employer liability for hostile work environments).
44. See id. at 105.
7
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considering BMW's liability, the Third Circuit determined that an em-
ployer could be liable for sexual harassment by its employees in one of two
ways. 45 First, under Restatement section 219(2) (b) (1), the employer is lia-
ble for its own negligence or recklessness, which, in harassment cases, is a
failure to discipline the employee or a failure to take some form of reme-
dial action after notification of the harassment.46 Alternatively, an em-
ployer could be liable under Restatement section 219(2)(d) if the
supervisor relied upon apparent authority or was aided by the agency
relationship.4 7
The Third Circuit would not, however, automatically hold an em-
ployer strictly liable for a sexually hostile work environment, even if a su-
pervisor were responsible. 4 8 The court concluded that an effective
grievance procedure, meaning the procedure was known to the victim and
timely stopped the harassment, would allow an employer to escape liability
under either section 219(2) (b) or section 219(2) (d) of the Restatement of
Agency. 49 BMW's "open door policy," and its thorough and immediate
investigation of the plaintiffs allegations, shielded BMW from any negli-
gence for hostile environment sexual harassment.50
C. Vicarious Employer Liability Emerges from Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
In the companion cases, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth5 1 and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,52 the United States Supreme Court faced the
45. See id. at 106.
46. See id. at 106-08 (noting that employer may be liable for its own negli-
gence); see also Knabe, 114 F.3d at 412 (holding that employer is liable under negli-
gence theory if management-level employees had actual or constructive knowledge
of sexually hostile work environment, but did not take prompt and adequate reme-
dial action (citing Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486)).
47. See Bouton, 29 F.3d at 106, 108-10; see also Knabe, 114 F.3d at 411 (reiterat-
ing that employers may be liable if supervisor relied upon apparent authority or
was aided by agency relationship). For a discussion of the agency relationship and
its current application, see infra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
48. See Bouton, 29 F.3d at 106 (noting that Mentor rejected notion that employ-
ers are strictly liable for hostile environment); see also Knabe, 114 F.3d at 411 (refus-
ing to find employers automatically liable for hostile environment).
49. See Bouton, 29 F.3d at 110 (holding effective grievance procedure protects
employer from Title VII liability). The court reasoned that by definition there
could be no negligence if an effective policy existed. See id. (stating "there is no
negligence if the procedure is effective"). The Bouton court took a public policy
stance with respect to apparent authority, reasoning that allowing employers to
escape liability would promote the establishment of effective anti-harassment poli-
cies. See id. (stating that employers have economic incentives "to recruit, train,
supervise their managers to prevent hostile environments").
50. See id. at 110 (concluding that BMW's procedure was adequate and ren-
dered them not negligent under Title VII hostile environment).
51. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
52. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
[Vol. 45: p. 767
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss4/7
CASEBRIEF
issue of when an employer is liable for a supervisor whose acts create a
hostile work environment for subordinates. 53
In Ellerth, Kimberly Ellerth, a midlevel sales manager, alleged that her
supervisor, Ted Slowick, sexually harassed her repeatedly during her one-
year employment with Burlington Industries. 54 Ellerth cited numerous
examples of sexual harassment, including one incident when Slowick com-
mented that he "could make [Ellerth's] life very hard or very easy at Bur-
lington" after Ellerth failed to give him any encouragement concerning
remarks he made about her breasts.55 On a second occasion, Slowick al-
legedly expressed reservations about promoting Ellerth because she was
not "loose enough," and then proceeded to rub her knee. 56 Ellerth also
alleged that on yet another occasion, Slowick informed her that her job
would be much easier if she wore short skirts. 57 Based on these events, the
lower courts found that Ellerth's claim could be classified as quid pro quo
sexual harassment, even though Slowick's threats had never come to
fruition.5 8
In resolving the case, the Supreme 'Court stated that although the
categories of quid pro quo harassment and hostile work environment
would still be useful in concluding that discrimination had occurred, the
categories were no longer controlling in determining vicarious liability for
the employer.59 In keeping with its decision in Meitor, the Court once
again looked to the law of agency to determine employer liability.60 The
Court determined that a supervisor could be held liable under the Restate-
ment section 219(1) if the supervisor was acting within the scope of his
53. SeeEllerth, 524 U.S. at 754, 757 (addressing whether employer can be vicar-
iously liable for hostile work environment created by supervisor); Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 785-86 (exploring issue of when employer is liable for acts of supervisory em-
ployee whose acts have created hostile environment for subordinates).
54. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747-48.
55. Id. at 748.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 750 (noting disagreement within lower courts as to whether em-
ployer liability for unfulfilled quid pro quo harassment claim should be vicarious
liability or negligence). Not only did Ellerth's supervisor fail to follow through
with his threats, but Ellerth was actually promoted during this period. See id. at 748
(noting that Ellerth received promotion following her promotion interview). For
a discussion of the requirements of quid pro quo sexual harassment claims, see
supra notes 36-39, and accompanying text.
59. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751-52 (finding categories of quid pro quo and
hostile work environment absent from statutory text of Title VII). The Court re-
tained the categories to determine when the sexual harassment is actionable. See
id. at 753 (illustrating relevance of categories to Title VII litigation). A showing of
quid pro quo harassment is actionable under Title VII because it establishes a
change in the terms and conditions of employment. See id. at 753-54. If the claim
falls under hostile environment sexual harassment, however, the plaintiff must go
further and show that the harassment was severe or pervasive. See id. at 754.
60. See id. (turning to principles of agency law to determine employer liability
because Title VII defines "employer" to include "agents").
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employment, but that, as a general rule, sexual harassment by a supervisor
is not considered to be within the scope of employment. 61
The Court found the "aided in the agency relationship" requirement
described in section 219(2) (d) to be of greater relevance and used it as
the foundation for its new rule for establishing employer liability, which
focused on whether a tangible employment action had occurred. 62 In an
opinion that is also set forth in Faragher, the Court then went on to hold
that employers are vicariously liable when a supervisor with immediate or
successively higher authority over the victimized employee creates an ac-
tionable hostile environment. 63
Where no tangible employment action has been taken against the em-
ployee, the employer can avoid liability and damages by raising an affirma-
tive defense. 64 The affirmative defense consists of two prongs: (1) the
employer must demonstrate that it "exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior," and (2) "that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise." 65 The Court stated that although it is not necessary for an
61. See id. at 756-57 (acknowledging that while employer may be held liable
for torts of employees acting within scope of their employment, sexual harassment
by supervisor is generally not considered to be conduct within scope of employ-
ment); see also Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 150-52 (3d Cir. 1999)
(finding employer may be liable for supervisors acting within scope of
employment).
62. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759-63 (discussing "aided in agency relation" stan-
dard in context of tangible employment action).
63. See id. at 765 ("An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with im-
mediate (or successively) higher authority over the employee."); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (same).
64. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 ("When no tangible employment action is
taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or dam-
ages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence .. " (citing FED. R. Civ.
P. 8(c)); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (same).
65. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; accord Faragher, 524 U.S. 807. The two-prong af-
firmative defense may subject an employer to liability even though the employer
has taken all possible steps to prevent and remedy the harassment. See Baderian et
al., supra note 12, at 359 (illustrating how employer may be unable to avoid liabil-
ity); Kruse, supra note 2, at 461 (noting employer may take all reasonable steps and
still be liable). A commonly posited scenario is one in which an employer has an
effective anti-harassment policy, follows up all complaints with an immediate and
thorough investigation, and takes proper disciplinary action against the harassing
supervisor. See Baderian et al., supra note 12, at 359 (creating scenario); Kruse,
supra note 2, at 461 (same). If the employee utilizes the employer's complaint
procedure, then the employee has not unreasonably failed to take advantage of
the preventive or corrective measures of the employer, and the affirmative defense
is unavailable. See Baderian et al., supra note 12, at 359 (finding second prong of
affirmative defense troublesome); Kruse, supra note 2, at 461 (same). Despite tak-
ing all reasonable steps suggested by the Supreme Court, an employer may still be
liable for the acts of its supervisors:
Once the employer learns of an employee's sexual harassment complaint,
the employer has little incentive to investigate the complaint if the em-
[Vol. 45: p. 767
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employer to have an anti-harassment policy with a complaint procedure,
the litigation of the first element may appropriately address the need for
such a policy, considering the employment circumstances. 66 Further-
more, the Court reasoned that the employer is not limited to evidence
that the employee failed to use the employer's complaint procedures
when proving the employee failed to use reasonable care to avoid harm,
but that such a failure by the employee will usually fulfill the employer's
burden under the second prong.
67
ployer will be liable regardless of its response. From a purely economic
standpoint, employers may wonder why they should terminate or disci-
pline high-level executives or "rainmaking" supervisors who have been
accused of sexual harassment, if the ultimate outcome of the complaint
will be that the employer is found liable regardless of its actions.
Baderian et al., supra note 12, at 359; accord Kruse, supra note 2, at 461-62 (arguing
that affirmative defense, which is dependent in part on actions of employee, leads
to judicial remedy that is "purely punitive").
It has been argued, however, that the affirmative defense is unfair to harassed
employees.
[T] here are often circumstances where a victim's fear of retaliation or
stigma or hesitance keeps her from reporting the harassment .... [T] he
victim's inaction is often immediately deemed unreasonable. This is
done in accordance with Ellerth, despite what are often genuinely compel-
ling circumstances to recognize the inaction as quite reasonable.
Kerni Lynn Bauchner, From Pig in a Parlor to Boar in a Boardroom: Why Ellerth Isn't
Working and How Other Ideological Models Can Help Reconceptualize the Law of Sexual
Harassment, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 303, 316 (1999) (arguing unfairness of af-
firmative defense to harassed employees).
66. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 ("While proof that an employer had promul-
gated an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every
instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment
circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first
element of the defense."); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (same). In light of these
words, the circuit courts have given great weight to the existence of an effective
anti-harassment policy when considering the employer's obligations under the first
prong of the affirmative defense. See Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 932-33
(7th Cir. 1999) (considering employer's posted sexual harassment policy with in-
structions for reporting harassment in determining that employer had exercised
reasonable care); Sims v. Health Midwest Physician Serv. Corp., 196 F.3d 915, 919
(8th Cir. 1999) (reproducing employer's sexual harassment policy when deciding
whether material facts remained concerning employer's exercise of reasonable
care); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999)
(noting that although not dispositive, "an anti-harassment policy with complaint
procedures is an important consideration in determining whether the employer
has satisfied the first prong of this defense"); Pacheco v. New Life Bakery, Inc., 187
F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that employer had no sexual harassment
policy or complaint procedure in determining employer had not satisfied reasona-
ble care standard under first prong of affirmative defense); Lissau v. Southern
Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding effective anti-harass-
ment policy is "compelling proof' of effort to stop harassment).
67. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 ("And while proof that an employee failed to
fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited
to showing unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the em-
ployer's burden under the second element of the defense."); Faragher, 524 U.S. at
807-08 (same); Savino, 199 F.3d at 932-34 (granting affirmative defense because
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In cases where the supervisor's harassment results in a tangible em-
ployment action, the affirmative defense is not available.68 The Court de-
fined an adverse tangible employment action as a "significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a signifi-
cant change in benefits."69 Because Ellerth had not alleged a tangible
employment action at the hands of her supervisor, the case was remanded
to give Burlington an opportunity to assert and prove the affirmative
defense. 70
In Faragher, the companion case to Ellerth, the Supreme Court once
again dealt with the issue of when an employer may be liable for a supervi-
sor who has created a hostile work environment by sexually harassing sub-
ordinates. 71 Ann Faragher was a lifeguard working for the city of Boca
Raton. 72 Faragher alleged that her immediate supervisors, Bill Terry and
employee failed to report harassment when asked and then waited several months
to report it); Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295-96 (granting affirmative defense because of
employee's failure to report sexual harassment); Scrivner v. Socorro Indep. Sch.
Dist., 169 F.3d 969, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1999) (granting affirmative defense consider-
ing plaintiff's failure to report harassment); Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting employer must go beyond showing plaintiff unreasonably
delayed in reporting harassment and must also show reasonable person in plain-
tiff's position could have prevented harassment from becoming "severe or perva-
sive" by coming forward earlier); Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 889-90
(8th Cir. 1998) (remanding case because reasonableness of waiting for two months
to report harassment was question of fact). But see Sharp v. City of Houston, 164
F.3d 923, 931 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting plaintiff was reasonable not to report harass-
ment because plaintiff could have lost job).
68. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (holding no affirmative defense available if har-
assment leads to tangible employment action); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (holding
affirmative defense is unavailable if supervisor harassment results in tangible em-
ployment action). The circuits have determined a wide array of examples that do
not qualify as adverse tangible employment actions. See Savino, 199 F.3d at 933 n.8
(stating that reassignment to comparable office was not tangible employment ac-
tion); Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294 (holding that constructive discharge does not con-
stitute tangible employment action); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 510 (5th
Cir. 1999) (holding that changing grocery store clerk's work schedule, expanding
duties to include mopping floor, cleaning chrome in produce department, or re-
quiring clerk to check in with supervisor are not changes in employment status);
Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that
teacher's voluntary withdrawal from extracurricular activities following her receipt
of anonymous mail and phone calls allegedly from principal did not constitute
tangible employment action); Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172, 175 (4th Cir.
1998) (rejecting assignment of extra work not in plaintiff's job description and not
permitting her to attend professional conference as tangible employment actions).
But see Glickstein v. Neshaminy Sch. Dist., No. 96-6236, 1999 WL 58578, at *30
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1999) (finding assignment of extra, less desirable work and sub-
jecting plaintiff to other harm as result of rejection of sexual advances constituted
adverse tangible employment action).
69. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
70. See id. at 766 (remanding case).
71. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780 (setting forth issue of case).
72. See id.
[Vol. 45: p. 767
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David Silverman, created a sexually hostile atmosphere through "unin-
vited and offensive touching" of her and the other female lifeguards, as
well as making lewd comments. 73 Faragher never officially reported the
sexually harassing behavior to any upper-level management. 74 The city
had adopted a sexual harassment policy, which was contained in a memo-
randum from the City Manager and addressed to all employees, but the
memorandum never reached Faragher's division. 75 Two months before
Faragher's resignation, another female employee wrote to the city, com-
plaining that Terry and Silverman had sexually harassed her and several
other female lifeguards. 76 The city then investigated the complaint, and,
after finding that Terry and Silverman had behaved inappropriately, repri-
manded them and forced them to choose between leave without pay or
forfeiture of annual leave. 77
Employing the standard they had devised in Ellerth, the Court found
in favor of the plaintiff and held the city liable for the hostile environment
created by its supervisors. 78 The Court concluded that the city could not
use the affirmative defense against liability because it had failed to dissemi-
nate its sexual harassment policy to the beach employees, as well as failing
to keep track of the conduct of its supervisors.79
III. NARRATrvE ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF THE
FARAGHER/ELLERTH STANDARD
The decisions in Faragher and Ellerth have significantly reshaped em-
ployer liability for sexual harassment by a supervisor. The Third Circuit
has addressed employer liability concerning a supervisor's sexual harass-
ment twice within the last year. 80
A. Durham Life Insurance Co. v. Evans
In Durham Life Insurance Co. v. Evans,8 1 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit dealt with a female life insurance agent, Di-
ane Evans, who alleged that she was sexually harassed by the managers of
the agency. 82 Evans claimed that on one occasion a manager, William
73. See id.
74. See id. at 782-83 (noting that Faragher did speak informally with another
supervisor who did not feel authorized to report it).
75. See id. at 781-82.
76. See id. at 783.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 810 (remanding case to district court for judgment to be reen-
tered in favor of plaintiff).
79. See id. at 808.
80. See, e.g., Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1999) (ad-
dressing employer liability for supervisor's sexually harassing conduct); Hurley v.
Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 1999) (same).
81. 166 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1999).
82. See id. at 144.
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McKaskill, told her she "made too much money for a goddamn woman,"
and later grabbed her buttocks and told her she smelled good.83 Another
manager, William Owens, allegedly asked Evans to go dancing "into the
fields with him," informing her that he could fire her if she didn't acqui-
esce to his wishes, and that she would be sued by her employer if she
reported the incident or quit and took her business with her.8 4 Following
these incidents, Evans' secretary was taken away, and she was assigned a
disproportionate amount of "lapsed books," policies that are no longer
active, which had a significant negative impact on Evans' commission earn-
ings.8 5 Finally, Evans resigned and filed a discrimination suit after she was
deceptively stripped of her private office and denied access to client files
that were necessary for her to perform her work.8 6
The Third Circuit began its decision concerning employer liability by
questioning whether the supervisory acts fell inside or outside the scope of
employment.8 7 The court was guided in its approach by the Supreme
Court's decisions in Faragher and Ellerth, which held that, in addition to the
"aided in the agency test," an employer may be liable for its supervisor's
acts under a scope of employment theory.8 8 The Evans court rejected
utilizing a scope of employment analysis, however, because the district
court had not provided the necessary findings concerning the harasser's
intent.8 9 Furthermore, the Evans court determined that even though a
scope of employment analysis may be available to a plaintiff, the aided in
the agency test, and how it is to be utilized, has been more clearly defined
by the Supreme Court and, therefore, should be used instead. 90
83. See id. at 14546.
84. See id. at 145.
85. See id. at 146.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 150.
88. See Evans, 166 F.3d at 150 (acknowledging that Faragher and ElLerth consid-
ered scope of employment as possible source of liability); see also Burlington In-
dus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (holding that employer may be liable if
supervisor, acting within scope of employment, harasses employee); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793-94 (discussing scope of employment as possi-
ble basis for employer liability for supervisory acts). For a further discussion of
scope of employment liability, see supra note 39.
89. See Evans, 166 F.3d at 151.
90. See id. at 151-52 (holding that scope of employment is elusive concept,
and agency relation test should be favored); see also Hurley v. Atlantic City Police
Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 119 n.18 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting Supreme Court had not dis-
cussed how motivations for scope of employment should be determined). Despite
holding that the aided in the agency test should be favored, the Third Circuit did
engage in an informative and "metaphysical" discussion concerning the theoretical
application of, and remaining questions surrounding, scope of employment. See
Evans, 166 F.3d at 151-52 n.6 (discussing overlap between aided in agency and
scope of employment tests).
780 [Vol. 45: p. 767
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Employing the aided in the agency test, the Third Circuit concluded
that Evans had suffered a tangible adverse employment action. 9 1 The
court's conclusion was based on the "loss of Evans' office, the dismissal of
her secretary, the missing files, and the lapse assignments that led to a fifty
percent pay decrease."9 2 Because Evans suffered a tangible employment
action, the court found that an affirmative defense to liability was not avail-
able, and that the employer was automatically liable for the manager's
conduct.93 The court next rejected the argument that McKaskill was not
Evans' supervisor, which would have precluded automatic liability under
the aided in the agency test.94 The court noted that witnesses considered
him to be part of the ruling "triumvirate" in the office, and that he was two
levels above the plaintiff according to the company's own charts. 95
B. Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department
In Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department,96 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit once again addressed the issue of employer
liability. Donna Hurley, a female police sergeant, brought a sexual harass-
ment suit against the Atlantic City Police Department ("ACPD"), alleging
that a police chief, a police captain and a police sergeant sexually harassed
her over the course of her employment.97 Hurley alleged that when she
complained to her supervisor, Captain Henry Madamba, about various in-
cidents of harassment, he replied that women working in the private sec-
tor avoided sexual harassment because they "sleep with their bosses." 98 In
light of Madamba's additional comments, such as that he lost weight by
"having sex a few times a day," and that women would come to him "when
they're ready," Hurley believed he was soliciting her for sex.99
91. See Evans, 166 F.3d at 153-54 (stating that loss of secretary and private
office, which were negotiated conditions of Evans' employment, constituted tangi-
ble adverse actions).
92. M at 153-54.
93. See id. at 152 (holding employer automatically liable if tangible adverse
employment action occurred). The employer argued that the affirmative defense
should still apply because Evans had not reported the harassment as soon as it
occurred, which would have permitted the employer to investigate and stop the
harassment before any tangible employment action had occurred. See id. at 154
(refusing to consider counterfactual inquiry). The court rejected this argument
because it would lead to complex litigation and would perversely burden plaintiffs'
with extensive evidence of past discrimination. See id. (examining impact of per-
mitting employers to use argument).
94. See id. at 154-55 (holding that McKaskill was Evans' supervisor).
95. See id. (holding that other employees and company considered him to
exert authority around office). The court also noted that it is unnecessary to have
complete authority to act alone in order to qualify for supervisor liability under
Title VII's agency standard. See id.
96. 174 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 1999)
97. See id. at 103-06 (describing various incidents of sexual harassment, such
as sexually explicit graffiti, solicitations for sex and derogatory poetry).
98. Id. at 120.
99. See id.
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In Hurley, the issue before the court was whether to award the ACPD,
which had been found liable for its supervisors' harassment, a new trial in
light of the new Faragher/Ellerth standard that had been handed down just
after the initial oral arguments on the appeal.10 0 Based on the affirmative
defense established in Faragher and Ellerth, the court held that the jury had
not been improperly informed that an effective sexual harassment policy
was only one factor in determining liability and was not an absolute de-
fense.10 1 Furthermore, the court found the point moot because the
ACPD's five avenues by which to lodge a complaint were ineffective; there-
fore, the policy did not satisfy the first prong of the affirmative defense.10 2
The court then went on to hold that Hurley was under no obligation to try
all the available avenues by which to file a complaint because she had in-
formed her immediate supervisor of the harassment.10 3
IV. PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE TO LITIGATING EMPLOYER LIABILITY IN THE
THIRD CIRCUIT
A. What is an Adverse Tangible Employment Action?
Determining whether the plaintiff-employee has suffered a tangible
adverse employment action is of paramount importance in litigating em-
ployer liability for a hostile environment created by a supervisor.1 0 4 If
there is a tangible adverse employment action, the employer is automati-
cally liable, whereas if there is no such action, the employer may seek ref-
uge in the affirmative defense.10 5 As noted above, the Supreme Court
defined an adverse tangible employment action as a "significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a signifi-
100. See id. at 117 (discussing possible basis for new trial in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions).
101. See id. at 118-19 (describing affirmative defense established by Supreme
Court and holding effective sexual harassment does not create absolute defense).
But see Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994) (conclud-
ing that BMW's effective sexual harassment procedure was adequate and rendered
them not negligent under Title VII hostile environment claim).
102. See Hurley, 174 F.3d at 118 (pointing out that Hurley could have gone to
her direct supervisor, Internal Affairs, Affirmative Action Officer, Police Chief and
Union, but that all these options were proved ineffective).
103. See id. (holding plaintiff had fulfilled obligation under ACPD's own pro-
cedure by putting immediate supervisor on notice of harassment).
104. See Lyon & Phillips, supra note 36, at 633 ("The presence of a tangible
action is now the guidepost for liability in all cases involving sexual harassment by
supervisors."); Jules L. Smith & Harry B. Bronson, Avoiding and Litigating Sexual
Harassment Claims Under the 1998 Supreme Court Decisions: Ellerth, Faragher, and On-
cale, 606 PLI/LIT. 289, 305 (1999) ("[D]isputes of the existence of tangible ad-
verse action will be hotly contested in certain factual scenarios in the future.").
105. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (holding
that whether employer may seek affirmative defense hinges on existence of tangi-
ble adverse employment action); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807
(same).
[Vol. 45: p. 767
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cant change in benefits . . . and in most cases inflicts direct economic
harm."10 6 Some courts have taken a restrictive view of the Court's words,
holding that non-economic actions such as constructive discharges, job
reassignments and extra work do not constitute an adverse tangible job
action. 107
. The Third Circuit has taken a more expansive view of what qualifies
as a tangible adverse employment action, holding in Durham that
"[a] lthough direct economic harm is an important indicator of a tangible
adverse employment action, it is not the sine qua non."1 08 The Third Cir-
cuit then went on to conclude that the loss of the plaintiffs office, the
firing of her secretary and missing files could also qualify as tangible ad-
verse employment actions.10 9 In Glickstein v. Neshaminy School District,110
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
heard the case of a plaintiff who alleged that her supervisor assigned her
extra work, as well as less desirable work, such as monitoring study hall
and the cafeteria.11 1 The district court also took a more expansive ap-
106. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (listing "discharge, demotion, or undesirable reas-
signment" as examples of tangible employment action).
107. See Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 933 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding
that reassignment to comparable office is not tangible employment action);
Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
"constructive discharge does not constitute a 'tangible employment action'");
Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that changing
one's work schedule, expanding duties to include mopping the floor, cleaning
chrome in produce department, or requiring employee to check in with supervi-
sor, are not significant changes in employment status); Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch.
Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that teacher's voluntary with-
drawal from extracurricular activities following her receipt of anonymous mail and
phone calls allegedly from principal did not constitute tangible employment ac-
tion); Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172, 175 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that supervi-
sor assigning extra work, and work not in plaintiff's job description, as well as not
allowing her to attend professional conference, were not tangible employment ac-
tions); Darrell S. Gay et al., Summary Judgment in the Aftermath of Ellerth and
Faragher, 604 PLI/LIT. 49, 77-78 (1999) (noting that caselaw seems to indicate
courts are unwilling to extend definition of tangible adverse employment action);
Paul E. Starkman, Learning the New Rules of Sexual Harassment: Faragher, Ellerth and
Beyond, 66 DEF. COUNS.J. 317, 323 (1999) (noting that majority of tangible employ-
ment actions will involve some kind of economic injury and decreased chances for
employment).
108. Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 153 (3d Cir. 1999). Sine
qua non is "[w] ithout which not. That without which cannot be. An indispensable
requisite or condition." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1385 (6th ed. 1990).
109. See Evans, 166 F.3d at 153-54; see also Dilenno v. Goodwill Indus. of Mid-
Eastern Pa., 162 F.3d 235, 236 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that lateral transfer to posi-
tion that employer knows may constitute adverse employment action in retaliation
claim). The Evans court considered the more difficult lapse assignments to consti-
tute a tangible adverse employment action, but qualified its finding by noting that
the assignments resulted in the loss of 50% of the plaintiffs earnings. See Evans,
166 F.3d at 153-54 (concluding that actions by employer constituted adverse tangi-
ble employment).
110. No. 96-6236, 1999 WL 58578, *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1999).
111. See id. at *14.
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proach, concluding that such action could constitute a tangible employ-
ment action "akin to a demotion or a reassignment entailing significantly
different job responsibilities." 1 12
The Third Circuit has potentially opened a floodgate as to what ac-
tions may constitute a tangible adverse employment action. While adverse
economic actions taken by a supervisor against an employee will present
the strongest arguments for an adverse tangible employment action, the
Third Circuit has indicated that a plaintiff may also succeed by establish-
ing other non-economic means by which a supervisor has negatively im-
pacted his or her work. 13
B. Is the Affirmative Defense Available?
The most heated litigation involving Title VII harassment will be cases
in which there has been no tangible adverse employment action, allowing
an employer to seek refuge from liability in the affirmative defense estab-
lished by Faragher and Ellerth.11 4 The affirmative defense is only applicable
if the employer can satisfy two elements.' 15 First, the employer must have
"exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior."' 16 Second, the plaintiff-employee must not have "un-
reasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective oppor-
tunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."' 17
1. Employer's Duty of Care
In addressing the first prong of the affirmative defense, the Supreme
Court stated that a disseminated and effective anti-harassment policy ap-
propriate to the circumstance could be proof that an employer exercised
reasonable care. 118 The Faragher Court emphasized the need for an effec-
tive anti-harassment policy when it held that an employer did not exercise
112. Id.
113. For a further discussion of economic and noneconomic tangible employ-
ment actions, see supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
114. See Lyon & Phillips, supra note 36, at 620 ("This affirmative defense will
most certainly be the future battle ground in cases involving sexual harassment by
supervisors that do not involve a tangible employment action."); see also Paul
Buchanan & Courtney W. Wiswall, The Evolving Understanding of Workplace Harass-
ment and Employer Liability: Implications of Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under Title
VI, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 55, 66 (1999) ("Much of the post-Faragher/Burlington
litigation involving employer liability for supervisor harassment likely will focus on
the question of whether the employer can satisfy the two-part affirmative
defense.").
115. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (discuss-
ing two requirements to utilize affirmative defense); Faragher v. City of Boca Ra-
ton, 524 U.S. at 807 (1998) (same).
116. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
117. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
118. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (holding that although not necessary in every
instance, need for anti-harassment policy may be addressed); Faragher, 524 U.S. at
807 (same).
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reasonable care because the employer had failed to disseminate its anti-
harassment policy, and that the policy was inadequate because it did not
offer any assurance that the employee could bypass the harassing supervi-
sors when filing a complaint. 119 The various circuits have followed suit,
holding that an effective anti-harassment policy is an important factor in
determining whether an employer has exercised reasonable care and,
therefore, satisfied the first prong of the affirmative defense. 120
In Hurley, the Third Circuit was careful to note that it would not allow
"an absolute defense to a hostile work environment claim whenever the
employer can point to an anti-harassment policy of some sort."121 The
court did, however, indicate that an effective, widely disseminated anti-
harassment policy is a factor to consider in determining whether an em-
ployer has exercised reasonable care. 122 The court then proceeded to re-
ject an affirmative defense as a plausible option for the police department
because, as the district court found, the department's five avenues of com-
plaint were ineffective.
123
Prevention through an effective, written anti-harassment policy is only
one aspect of an employer's duty to exercise reasonable care; an employer
must also respond to and correct the harassing behavior once it is re-
ported. 124 The United States Courts of Appeal for the Second, Seventh
and Ninth Circuits have considered the adequacy of the employer's inves-
119. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (addressing findings by district court).
120. See Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1999) (consid-
ering employer's posted sexual harassment policy with instructions for reporting
harassment in determining that employer had exercised reasonable care); Sims v.
Health Midwest Physician Serv. Corp., 196 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir. 1999) (repro-
ducing employer's sexual harassment policy in deciding whether material facts re-
mained concerning employer's exercise of reasonable care); Caridad v. Metro-
North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that while not
dispositive, "an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedures is an important
consideration in determining whether the employer has satisfied the first prong of
the defense"); Pacheco v. New Life Bakery, Inc., 187 F.3d 1055, 1061-62 (9th Cir.
1999) (deciding that employer had not satisfied reasonable care standard under
first prong of affirmative defense because employer had no sexual harassment pol-
icy and no complaint procedure); Lissau v. Southern Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d
177, 182 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that effective anti-harassment policy is compel-
ling proof of effort to stop harassment).
121. Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 118 (3d Cir. 1998).
122. See id. at 119-20 (discussing anti-harassment policy and upholding jury
instructions that considered such policy to be factor in employer liability); Whita-
ker v. Mercer County, 65 F. Supp. 2d 230, 245 (D.NJ. 1999) (discussing existence
of complaint procedure in context of affirmative defense); see also Durham Life
Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 152 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting scope of employment
analysis fearing it "might make effective anti-harassment programs irrelevant to
employer liability in many hostile environment cases").
123. See Hurley, 174 F.3d at 118 (noting that district court found direct super-
visor, Internal Affairs, the Affirmative Action Officer, the Chief and Union to be
ineffective avenues of complaint).
124. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (holding
employer must prevent and promptly correct harassing behavior); Faragher, 524
U.S. at 807 (same).
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tigation, whether the harassing supervisor has been reprimanded, as well
as other remedies, such as relocating the employee, to determine whether
the employer has corrected the harassment. 125 In Hurley, the Third Cir-
cuit held that the police department had not exercised reasonable care, in
part, because of its failure to investigate the harassing behavior of its em-
ployees, as well as the inaction of the plaintiff's supervisor upon discover-
ing the existence of the sexual harassment.' 2 6
Although the Third Circuit has provided little guidance as to what
steps an employer must take to correct the harassment in the aftermath of
Faragher and Ellerth, its earlier decisions may be indicative of what is neces-
sary to satisfy the employer's duty of reasonable care. In Knabe v. Boury
Corp.,127 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
an employer exercised reasonable care when the harassing supervisor was
warned that the company would not tolerate harassment on penalty of
suspension or termination. 128 The harassed employee was also returned
to the work schedule from which she had been removed and was provided
with four names and phone numbers in the event of further harass-
ment.' 29 The court determined that the remedial action was "adequate as
a matter of law because it was reasonably calculated to prevent further
harassment."13 0 Furthermore, the court determined that even if the inves-
tigation into the harassment was flawed, an employer might escape liabil-
ity, unless the remedial action taken by the employer was also
inadequate. 13 ' The court did acknowledge, however, that in some in-
stances an investigation may be so flawed, such as missing certain severe
instances of harassment, that the chosen remedial action could not possi-
bly be adequate. 132 In Bouton, the court held that the employer had taken
adequate remedial measures by promptly investigating upon receipt of the
first complaint of harassment and immediately transferring the employee
to a different supervisor.' 3 3
125. See Savino, 199 F.3d at 933 (holding that investigation of complaint, rep-
rimanding of supervisor followed by suspension, and relocation of employee, satis-
fied employer's duty of reasonable care); Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295 (finding that
employer satisfied reasonable care under first prong because it investigated and
remedied problems reported by employees); Pacheco, 187 F.3d at 1062 (holding
that employer failed to exercise reasonable care when relative of employer con-
ducted investigation, other female employees were not interviewed, and supervisor
was not reprimanded despite his admission he may have grabbed plaintiff).
126. See Hurley, 174 F.3d at 118.
127. 114 F.3d 407 (3d Cir. 1997).
128. See id. at 413.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 414 (holding that court would overlook flawed investigation if
effective action).
132. See id. at 414.
133. See Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994). Given
the Third Circuit's attention to whether an investigation has been conducted, em-
ployer's should be advised to implement a thorough investigation program. For
786 [Vol. 45: p. 767
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The most important lesson to be gleaned from the foregoing discus-
sion is that employers should be advised of the necessity of implementing
effective anti-harassment policies.1 3 4 In general, the policy should: (1) in-
clude examples of unacceptable behavior and explain that no company
official or supervisor may engage in such conduct; (2) provide a bypass
mechanism whereby an employee may contact alternative departments or
people in the event that the employee is uncomfortable talking to a super-
visor; and (3) make clear that any allegations will be investigated with no
fear of retribution. 135 All employees should also receive a copy of the pol-
icy by the first day of work, and "the employee should sign a receipt ac-
knowledging that he or she has received the policy, has read it, and
understands it. This receipt should be kept in the employee's personnel
file .... [These steps] will have been useless unless the employer immedi-
ately conducts a thorough, well-documented investigation of all
complaints.' 3
6
an in depth discussion of how to conduct a proper investigation into allegations of
sexual harassment written from the perspective of a Third Circuit practitioner,
refer to Judith E. Harris, Sexual Harassment Investigations, SE17 ALI-ABA 53 (1999),
and Rosalind S. Fink, Overview of Sexual Harassment Law, 621 PLI/LIT. 7, 40-42
(1999).
134. See Lyon & Phillips, supra note 36, at 646 (arguing that distributed, writ-
ten anti-harassment policy is key to showing employer acted reasonably); see also
Richelle Wise Kidder, Comment, A Conciliatory Approach to Workplace Harassment.
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 36 Hous.
L. REv. 1316, 1345 (1999) (noting that employers should make sure policies are
distributed and establish grievance procedure).
135. See Lyons & Phillips, supra note 36, at 646-67 (explaining necessary ele-
ments of effective anti-harassment policy); see also Duran v. Flagstar Corp., 17 F.
Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (D. Colo. 1998) (finding that policy containing similar crite-
ria was adequate); Baderian et al., supra note 12, at 365 (listing elements to include
in anti-harassment policy); Smith & Bronson, supra note 104, at 306-17 (discussing
in detail elements that will, and will not, make employer's policy adequate);
Starkman, supra note 107, at 333 (listing steps employer must take to construct
adequate policy to exercise reasonable care); Kidder, supra note 134, at 1349
(broadly outlining what effective anti-harassment policy should contain); Kruse,
supra note 2, at 467-68 (discussing steps employer must take regarding sexual har-
assment policy).
136. Lyons & Phillips, supra note 36, at 646-47. In Baderian et al., the authors
also go beyond the scope of an effective anti-harassment policy in providing steps
an employer may take to prevent and respond to anti-harassment suits:
1. Review Your Sexual Harassment and Anti-Retaliation Policy...
2. Identify All Supervisors and Make Them Accountable for Compli-
ance with the Employer's Sexual Harassment and Anti-Retaliation
Policy...
3. Train All Supervisors on Sexual Harassment Prevention ...
4. Train Non-Supervisory Employees on the Sexual Harassment Policy
and the Procedures to Follow if They Experience Sexual
Harassment...
5. Obtain a Signed Receipt When Distributing the Sexual Harassment
Policy...
6. Periodically Redistribute the Sexual Harassment Policy and Obtain
Updated Receipts...
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2. Employee Duty of Care
In addition to requiring the employer to exercise reasonable care by
responding to and correcting the sexual harassment, the Supreme Court
also held that the affirmative defense will not apply unless "the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or cor-
rective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm other-
wise."1 37 The Court then elaborated that showing an employee failed to
use any complaint procedure provided by the employer is one way to fulfill
the employer's burden under this element.1 38
In Hurley, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff-employee satisfied
her obligation under the second prong of the affirmative defense by put-
ting her supervisor on notice of the harassment, despite the fact that the
supervisor was himself responsible for much of the harassment.139 Fur-
thermore, the Hurley court rejected the police department's argument
that the employee was obligated to explore all of the department's five
avenues of complaint, holding that it was sufficient that the plaintiff noti-
fied her supervisor, who, according to the police department's own policy,
was responsible for preventing and correcting the harassment.140 There-
fore, employers must make sure that all channels for communicating sexu-
ally harassing behavior are effective. 14 '
7. Instruct Appropriate Managers on the Guidelines for Conducting
Investigations of Sexual Harassment Complaints ...
8. Incorporate the Sexual Harassment Policy into New Employee
Orientation ...
9. Document Efforts to Prevent and Correct Harassment and Any Em-
ployee's Failure to Take Advantage of the Opportunities Provided
by the Employer...
10. Assert the New Affirmative Defense in Pending or Future Sexual
Harassment Lawsuits
Baderian et al., supra note 12, at 365-68.
137. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). For suggestions on how a plaintiff
should conduct discovery under the second prong of the affirmative defense, see
Loretta T. Attardo & Tamsin R. Kaplan, Practice Pointers on Opposing the Affirmative
Defense Established by Ellerth and Faragher. The Second Prong: That the Sexually
Harassed Employee "Unreasonably Failed to Take Advantage of Any Preventive or Corrective
Opportunities Provided by the Employer or to Avoid Harm Otherwise", 606 PLI/LIT. 347,
352-53 (1999).
138. See Ellerth, 118 524 U.S. at 765 (noting that, while not dispositive, em-
ployee's failure to use employer's complaint procedure normally satisfies em-
ployer's burden under second prong); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08 (same).
139. See Hurley, 174 F.3d 95, 118 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that supervisor was
responsible for some acts of harassment).
140. See id. (noting that plaintiff was not obligated to try all available channels
by which to file complaint). The court noted the plaintiff could also have com-
plained to the "Internal Affairs, the Affirmative Action Officer, the Chief through
his 'open door policy,' and the union grievance procedure." Id.
141. See Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 933 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting
employee's failure to report acts of harassment which she later alleged in suit);
Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295-96 (2d Cir. 1999)
(granting affirmative defense in light of employees' failure to report sexual harass-
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Although the Third Circuit has not yet indicated how it will proceed
in the event that an employee does not notify an employer of the sexual
harassment, the majority of the other circuits have been unforgiving in
such scenarios. For instance, in Caridad v. Metro North Commuter Rail-
road,1 42 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted
the employer the protection of the affirmative defense, holding that the
employee had no valid excuse for not reporting the harassment because
there was no fear that her complaint would not be taken seriously or that
she would be exposed to an adverse consequence for filing the com-
plaint.143 The Third Circuit has not faced a situation in which an em-
ployee has delayed reporting the sexual harassment, although other
circuits have permitted consideration of such delays in determining
whether the employer has satisfied the second prong of the affirmative
defense. 144
While much attention has been devoted to whether an employee has
taken advantage of an employer's preventive or corrective measures, the
Faragher and Ellerth decisions provided no guidance regarding how to de-
termine when an employee failed "to avoid harm otherwise." 145 As a last
resort, employers may be able to take advantage of this undefined area to
creatively prove that an employee has failed to meet the obligation to pre-
vent the sexual harassment. 146 For instance, there has been some specula-
tion that an employer may be able to use the following phrase as a
defense: "where the employee joined in sexual banter or horseplay in the
ment); Scrivner v. Socorro, 169 F.3d 969, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1999) (granting affirma-
tive defense when plaintiff failed to report sexual harassing conduct of supervisor
to investigator acting in response to anonymous letter). But see Sharp v. City of
Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 931 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting plaintiff was reasonable in not
reporting harassment because of potential ramifications which included losing her
career).
142. 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
143. See Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295-96 (granting affirmative defense in light of
employee's failure to report sexual harassment).
144. See, e.g., Savino, 199 F.3d at 932-33 (emphasizing fact that plaintiff waited
several months before reporting harassment in deciding jury properly granted af-
firmative defense); Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting
that employer must go beyond showing plaintiff unreasonably delayed in reporting
harassment and must also show that reasonable person in plaintiff's position could
have prevented harassment from becoming "severe or pervasive" if he or she came
forward earlier); Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 1998)
(remanding case because reasonableness of waiting for two months to report har-
assment was question of fact).
145. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (discuss-
ing second requirement for affirmative defense); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (same).
146. See Baderian et al., supra note 12, at 360 (noting phrase may be addi-
tional avenue for employer to show employee did not adequately prevent harass-
ment); Lyon & Phillips, supra note 36, at 644 ("[T]his little phrase added to the
end of the second prong, appearing to be almost an afterthought, could be fertile
ground for both argument and future litigation, and may well serve as a last resort
for the employer in the appropriate case.").
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workplace, [but probably not] where the plaintiff wore provocative cloth-
ing to work."147
C. Supervisor or Not?
Under the Faragher/Ellerth standard, an employer is subject to auto-
matic liability only if the hostile environment is created by a supervisor
with "immediate (or successively) higher authority over the employee."1 48
In Durham, the Third Circuit looked to a variety of sources to determine
whether the person in question was the plaintiff-employee's supervisor. 149
The court noted that witnesses testified that the alleged supervisor was a
member "of the ruling 'triumvirate,"' that he was two levels above the
plaintiff according to the company's own charts, and that he joined forces
with two other men to coerce the supervisor into stripping the plaintiff of
her office. 15 0 Finally, the court noted that it is not necessary to have com-
plete authority to act on behalf of the employer without consulting others
in order to be considered a supervisor under Title VII. 15 1 The court's
holding indicates that litigating "who" constitutes a supervisor will not be
limited to merely examining the tides bestowed on an individual, but will
extend to an individual's functions, actions and how one is perceived in
the workplace. 152
V. CONCLUSION
In expounding upon the issues raised by the Supreme Court's hold-
ings in Faragher and Ellerth, the Third Circuit has chosen to foster creative
litigation by rejecting rigid definitions. For instance, the Third Circuit has
indicated a willingness to look beyond merely economic adverse conse-
quences in determining if an employee has been subjected to an adverse
147. Lyon & Phillips, supra note 36, at 644.
148. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (setting forth situation by which employer may be
held vicariously liable); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (same).
149. See Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1999)
(examining various sources to determine supervisory capacity).
150. See id. at 154 (listing variety of indicators that McKaskill was plaintiff's
supervisor); see also, Goodwin v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., No. 96-CV-2301, 1998 WL
438488, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1998) (holding high-level executive was supervi-
sor based on job description). In Goodwin, the individual in question was an officer
of a realty company and a bottling company, both of which operated from the
same plant. See id. (noting evidence presented to prove individual was plaintiffs
supervisor). The harassing individual spent most of his time working for the realty
company, but the court noted that executives of the bottle company set labor poli-
cies and managed the day-to-day operations of both companies. See id. Based on
these facts, the court found that ajury could conclude that a necessary supervisory
role existed. See id. (holding that sufficient evidence existed to support jury
decision).
151. See Evans, 166 F.3d at 154-55 (citing Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132
F.3d 20, 23 (3d Cir. 1997)).
152. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to employer liability, see
supra notes 104-52 and accompanying text.
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tangible employment action. 153 Furthermore, while giving due weight to
the existence of an effective anti-harassment policy, the Third Circuit has
also focused on the employer's remedial actions in determining whether it
has secured the protection of the affirmative defense to strict liability.
15 4
The Third Circuit has allowed for much leeway in determining whether
one may be considered a supervisor for the purposes of Title VII.1
55
At the same time, the Third Circuit has left some questions unan-
swered. For instance, future litigation is necessary to determine under
what circumstances an employee may reasonably fail to notify an employer
of incidents of sexual harassment by a supervisor.156 Certainly, the deci-
sions handed down by the Third Circuit will afford an opportunity for
both plaintiffs and employers to be creative in litigating employer liability
for sexually hostile environments perpetrated by supervisors.
David F McCann
153. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation of an adverse tangi-
ble employment action, see supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of anti-harassment poli-
cies and remedial actions, see supra notes 118-36 and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of who may be considered a supervisor according to the
Third Circuit, see supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
156. For a discussion of an employee's duty to take advantage of an em-
ployer's preventive and corrective measures, see supra notes 137-48 and accompa-
nying text.
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